Evaluation of the Impact on Costs of Various Items in Cooperative Inventory Models with Multiple Agents
Authorship
E.D.G.
Master in Statistical Techniques
E.D.G.
Master in Statistical Techniques
Defense date
02.05.2025 10:30
02.05.2025 10:30
Summary
This work addresses the analysis of deterministic inventory models in the context of cooperative game theory, exploring their application to cost distribution problems. The fundamental concepts necessary for the study are presented, including an introduction to cooperative game theory, transferable utility (TU) games, and their main solutions, such as the core, the Shapley value, and the Owen value. Within the framework of inventory models, different configurations of the EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) model are analyzed, starting with the basic deterministic model and extending to cases involving multiple items and agents. Two key variants are examined: models with exemptible costs, which include constraints allowing certain coalitions to be excluded from cost contributions, and models without exemptible costs, where all coalitions fully participate. Throughout the work, an illustrative example is studied to highlight the implications of the models and their solutions in practice. Additionally, the impact of different cost distribution rules on the allocation among agents or items is analyzed, considering both fairness and system efficiency.
This work addresses the analysis of deterministic inventory models in the context of cooperative game theory, exploring their application to cost distribution problems. The fundamental concepts necessary for the study are presented, including an introduction to cooperative game theory, transferable utility (TU) games, and their main solutions, such as the core, the Shapley value, and the Owen value. Within the framework of inventory models, different configurations of the EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) model are analyzed, starting with the basic deterministic model and extending to cases involving multiple items and agents. Two key variants are examined: models with exemptible costs, which include constraints allowing certain coalitions to be excluded from cost contributions, and models without exemptible costs, where all coalitions fully participate. Throughout the work, an illustrative example is studied to highlight the implications of the models and their solutions in practice. Additionally, the impact of different cost distribution rules on the allocation among agents or items is analyzed, considering both fairness and system efficiency.
Direction
GARCIA JURADO, IGNACIO (Tutorships)
GARCIA JURADO, IGNACIO (Tutorships)
Court
AMEIJEIRAS ALONSO, JOSE (Coordinator)
Vidal Puga, Juan José (Chairman)
Oviedo de la Fuente, Manuel (Secretary)
PATEIRO LOPEZ, BEATRIZ (Member)
AMEIJEIRAS ALONSO, JOSE (Coordinator)
Vidal Puga, Juan José (Chairman)
Oviedo de la Fuente, Manuel (Secretary)
PATEIRO LOPEZ, BEATRIZ (Member)